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The Normalization of Homeland Security After
September 11: The Role of the Military in
Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response
William C. Banks*
Imagine that accomplices of the hijackers that commandeered the
airliners that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and
crashed in rural Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, had the variola
virus that causes smallpox and aerosol devices designed to disperse
smallpox. Once the crashes occurred, the accomplices would have
waited for the cover of nighttime and then covertly dispersed the
smallpox virus in densely populated areas in New York City and
Washington, D.C. As horrific as September 11 was, it could have
been much worse. If the terrorists had carried out an attack with a
biological agent as an aftermath to the hijackings,' designed to kill
silently while attention is focused on the immediate trauma, our
nation's public health and emergency management infrastructure
could have been brought to its knees.
Smallpox is an acute, infectious, disfiguring, highly contagious
disease that can cause slow and painful death in humans. Symptoms,
usually flu-like, may not appear for ten or more days.2 Exposure is
hard to avoid for anyone near the virus, particularly because the
variola virus is so easily airborne. There is no effective medical
treatment for smallpox, and the fatality rate is approximately thirty
percent.' Because the disease was eradicated worldwide by 1977, the
United States ended its mandatory vaccination program.4 Due to
aging populations and the waning effectiveness of old vaccinations,
virtually everyone is susceptible to the disease.
Although about 200,000 people would be infected in each of the
two primary exposure areas, the first five percent of affected
individuals would not show symptoms for seven days, and the
average case would not appear for nearly two weeks.5 Because most
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
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1. See Vernon Loeb and John Ward, Al Qaeda May Have Crude Chemical,
Germ Capabilities, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2001, at A18 for a discussion of Al
Qaeda's possible capabilities.
2. See generally, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Smallpox Fact Sheet: Smallpox Disease Overview,
available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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physicians have never seen a smallpox case, early analysis would
likely have been unable to determine the cause of illness. Although
the smallpox vaccine can prevent the onset of the disease if given
within three days of exposure,6 most potential victims would lose the
window of opportunity before the outbreak would be confirmed.
Two weeks after the attacks, public health officials in New York City
and Washington, D.C. would report thousands of dead and dying
people and tens of thousands of hospitalizations due to an outbreak
of unknown origins.
Hundreds of thousands more may have been exposed to the agent
as those exposed originally went about their daily lives. The area of
contamination and exposure would be unclear, especially since
travelers would have been moving to and from those cities into
untargeted areas. As contamination spreads, hospitals in other areas
would recognize sharp increases in patient load, including some
emergency personnel exposed in the initial responses. The sheer
numbers of sick people would quickly overload the resources in
many local areas. Growing awareness would also bring media
attention to the incident, which could create panic and make
containment increasingly difficult.
As federal agencies become involved with the local, state, and
non-governmental agencies, interagency relationships would become
strained due to the number of organizations involved, as well as the
ambiguity over command, control, and communications. The
unprecedented strain would complicate the interagency relationships
and could affect the flow of critical information to and from first-
responders.
Panic from the growing health crisis, limited response personnel,
and problems in coordinating emergency responses could result in
failures of the local infrastructure. Public transportation, telephone
and radio communications could break down, and road and air
transportation would quickly become overloaded. Fear that water
and food supplies could be contaminated may also cause strains on
supplies. Public health agencies in the affected areas would be
overwhelmed by the surge in the illness, and resources would not be
adequate to isolate all of those who are sick. Civilian
personnel-including law enforcement personnel-would begin to
abandon their tasks, as they fear contamination and are looking to
escape the area with their families. Despite their insufficient
resources, the Governor of New York and the Mayors of New York
City and Washington, D.C. would be pressured to consider state, city,
and district-wide orders of quarantine, and to forbid all unauthorized
traffic in or out of the areas.
6. Id.
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Law enforcement agencies would be overwhelmed by the
demands of maintaining order, making it easier for others allied with
the hijackers to slip undetected into mass transit, government
buildings, and other commercial public places, where they could
spread additional contagion with aerosolized smallpox spray.
Because it is relatively easy to make quantities of variola once the
virus is obtained, terrorists intent on disabling our government could
strike again and again, in new urban areas on successive days.7 New
cycles of outbreak and ensuing panic could continue indefinitely.
This scenario and others like it are no longer considered the
products of overfed imaginations. The specter of mass casualty
terrorist attacks on the homeland is now all too real, as is the prospect
that uniformed military may be deployed in our cities. In 1999, one
study of the threat of terrorism posed by weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)8 concluded that a "priority mission" of the Department of
Defense (DoD) would be "to develop, deploy, and operate a wide
range of defensive measures for the protection of the United States
homeland."9 The National Commission on Terrorism suggested in
June 2000 that a "catastrophe ... beyond the capabilities of local,
state, and other federal agencies" may prompt the President "to
designate DoD as a lead federal agency" to respond to a terrorist
attack in the homeland. Former Secretary of the Navy, Richard
Danzig, noted that a "single biological attack can kill a great many
people, while the technologies to develop and deliver these weapons
7. See Richard Danzig, Catastrophic Bioterrorism-What is to be Done? 12
(Ctr. for Tech. and Nat'l Security Pol'y 2003).
8. Federal law defines "weapons of mass destruction" in a variety of ways.
The simplest definition applies to "any weapon or device that [can] cause death or
serious bodily injury to a significant number of people." 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (Supp.
IV 1998). More complex definitions include:
(1) The term 'weapon of mass destruction' means any weapon or device
that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a significant number of people through the release,
dissemination, or impact of - (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their
precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity." 50
U.S.C. § 2302(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
According to Title 18 of the United States Code: "(2) the term 'weapon of
mass destruction' means - (A) any destructive device as defined in section
921 of this title; (B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact
of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; (C) any weapon
involving a disease organism; or (D) any weapon that is designed to
release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.
18 U.S.C. § 2332(c)(2) (2004).
9. Fred. C. Ikle, Defending the U.S. Homeland: Strategic and Legal Issues
for DOD and the Armed Services (Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studs. 1999).
10. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism 39 (2000), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nct.
2004] 737
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
are relatively inexpensive, accessible, and difficult to detect, much
less interdict."" When these risks are augmented by what Danzig
calls "reload," the capacity of terrorists to repeat the biological attack
over and over again ("we cannot shut down the atmosphere"), "our
national power to manage the consequences of repeated biological
attacks could be exhausted while the terrorist ability to reload
remains intact."'
2
After September 11, the military presence in the homeland
increased literally overnight. The President approved orders for the
Air Force to shoot down civilian airliners in the event of a hijacking,
National Guard troops were deployed at the nation's airports, and
more United States forces were deployed for security at the Salt Lake
City Olympic Games in February 2002 than were then deployed
fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. 3 In addition, President Bush
proposed and Congress established the Department of Homeland
Security 4 and conferred through that legislation, the USA PATRIOT
Act,' 5 and related intelligence authorization measures 6 with broad
new authorities to combat terrorism in the homeland.
Fundamental changes have also been made in the organization of
the military in relation to domestic security. The September 30,
2001, Quadrennial Defense Review Report restores the defense of the
United States as the DoD's primary mission, 7 and the National
Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 called for "a concerted
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,
reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur."' 8 On October 1,
2002, a new combatant command, the United States Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) became the first military entity since the
Civil War with responsibility for military activities inside the United
11. Danzig, supra note 7, at 1.
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. Gene Healy, Deployed in the U.S.A.-The Creeping Militarization of the
Home Front Policy Analysis 5 (The Cato Inst., Pol'y Analysis No. 503, Dec. 17,
2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-503es.html.
14. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
15. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-108, § 314(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001).
17. Dep't of Def., Quadrennial Defense Review Report 18-20 (Sept. 30, 2001).
18. See Office of Homeland Security, The White House, The National Strategy
for Homeland Security, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book
[hereinafter Homeland Security].
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States.' 9  It remains unclear what forces will be assigned to
NORTHCOM, and what roles NORTHCOM will play in homeland
security. Still, a recent Judge Advocate's Corps Operations Law
Handbook states that the "role of the military in domestic operations
has changed drastically '20 since September 11. But just what will
soldiers do in anticipation of or in response to a terrorist attack on the
homeland? On what legal bases are military activities planned?
Among the nations of the world, the United States has been
proudly unique in entrusting law enforcement to civilian forces,
managed and controlled by civilians. Our federal system has helped
cement control over and, thus, accountability for law enforcement
activities and decisions at the lowest levels of government, closest to
the operations being conducted. At the same time, our revolutionary
and constitutional heritage, fed by experiences in England and with
English military in the colonies, led to the creation of a sharp
separation of civilian and military spheres in government, and to the
unequivocal subordination of the military to civilian authority.
For more than 200 years, our laws and traditions have made
military presence in the homeland exceptional. Still, the domestic
use of troops has been a feature of government in this country since
President Washington called out the militia to put down the Whiskey
Rebellion in 1794. Since then, federal troops have been activated a
number of times to help keep the peace, to aid local governments in
natural disasters, and to enforce federal and state laws. State militia
has been deployed even more often, especially in the first three
decades of the twentieth century. Yet current concerns about the
ongoing threat of terrorist attacks in the homeland, worsened by the
specter of WMD threats, have caused civilian authorities to consider
what once would have been unthinkable-uniformed military
providing back-up to public health services by enforcing the laws and
undertaking military operations on our streets and in our
neighborhoods. To be sure, no other governmental entity has the
training, equipment, and resources to bring force to bear when an
attack occurs. Likewise, if the National Guard is counted, no other
part of government is so widely dispersed to be available throughout
the nation if its services are needed. But are military personnel
capable of refining their role to be engaged in support of public
health and law enforcement at home, among the people they are
charged to protect?
19. See U.S. Northern Command, at http://www.northcom.mil.
20. The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Operational Law
Handbook 355 (Joseph B. Berger III, Derek Grimes & Eric T. Jensen, eds., 2004),
available at https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/laawsxxi/cds.nsf [hereinafter
Operational Law Handbook].
2004] 739
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Express constitutional authority for such use is found in Article I,
section 8, which provides, "[tihe Congress shall have the power.., to
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions . *.". . " Additional
authority may be drawn from Article IV, section 4, which imposes on
the federal government the obligation to protect each of the states
"against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence."22 The President may also have authority to
deploy troops in defense of the homeland from his Article II powers
to faithfully execute the laws23 and to act as Commander in Chief of
the armed forces.24 However, the Framers intended that part-time
state-based militias would principally perform the homeland defense
tasks. Experience with the militias has been uneven, but these small,
professional, and state-governed forces largely sufficed, except for
wartime buildups, until the Cold War led to the development of a
sizable peacetime military establishment.
The most concrete manifestation of the American tradition of
keeping the military out of domestic civilian affairs lies in the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878, which in its current form states that
"[W]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise
to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."2 5
Although the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) supplies a general
statutory prohibition against domestic use of troops to enforce the
laws, the constitutional authorities of the President and a number of
statutory exceptions undercut or at least counter-balance the rule.
Some of the exceptions specifically apply to various forms of WMD
attacks by terrorists, and, following appropriate interagency
coordination, permit DoD personnel and equipment to engage in
containing, disabling, or disposing of the weapons involved in an
attack.26 In certain emergency circumstances, military personnel are
permitted to perform law enforcement functions, where civilian
authorities are not capable of taking appropriate action.27 Other
statutes anticipate civil disorder or other emergencies and permit
deployment of military units in various circumstances, certainly
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
22. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
23. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
24. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
26. 10 U.S.C. §§ 372(b), 382 (2001).
27. Id. § 382(d)(2)(B)(I) (2001).
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including in response to a terrorist attack.28 In addition, the President
arguably may deploy military personnel to perform civilian law
enforcement pursuant to his constitutional authorities.
The PCA remains as much a symbol of our nation's subordination
of military to civilian control, and to the distaste of military
involvement in domestic law enforcement, as it is a set of legal
strictures. As conditions and threats have changed, however, so has
the principle of posse comitatus. The tradition of civilian law
enforcement in the United States is undeniably longstanding and
deeply engrained. Yet, construed literally the PCA could
compromise a military role in support of civilian authorities during
a public health emergency or hinder a response to widespread
disorder in society. Interpreted too generously, the exceptions can
give rise to regrettable excesses, such as those documented at Kent
State University in 1970.30
This paper will focus on one aspect of the question posed by this
symposium-what should the normalization of national security post-
September 11 look like, and how do we get there-by examining the
role of the military in anticipating and responding to a biological
weapons terrorist attack on the homeland. The next section will
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5192, 5170b (c) (Stafford Act); 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335
(Insurrection Act); 10 U.S.C. § 371 (military support of law enforcement); 10
U.S.C. § 375 (bars direct miliary involvement in law enforcement unless otherwise
authorized by law); 18 U.S.C. 831 (e) (military assistance in emergency situations
involving nuclear materials).
29. An alternative way out of the legal woods may be to characterize a range
of tasks that may be performed by soldiers in a public health emergency as
something other than "executing the laws," as is proscribed by the PCA. Simply
put, the restrictions of the PCA may not apply if the military is doing public health
work instead of police work. Support for such an approach may be found in some
public health jurisprudence, where public health officials may issue administrative
warrants and impose civil sanctions, including quarantine and detention, because
criminal law sanctions are not invoked. See Edward P. Richards, The
Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against
Dangerous Individuals, 16 Hastings Con. L. Q. 329 (1989). Further examination
of this dichotomy is beyond the scope of this article.
30. Following President Nixon's announcement on April 30, 1970, that United
States combat forces had been deployed in Cambodia, student antiwar protests
erupted on a number of college campuses. The Governor of Ohio called out Ohio
National Guard troops equipped with loaded weapons to keep order at Kent State
University. When a large group of students gathered for a rally there on May 4,
1970 (would suggest inserting year here), the Guard troops tried to disperse them,
at one point firing into the crowd, killing four students and wounding nine others.
See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 2440 (1973) (dismissing a suit on
political question grounds that sought to restrain a state governor and National
Guard leaders from future violations of students' rights of free speech, assembly,
and due process).
31. The article will not address the origins of posse comitatus and its evolution
7412004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
review briefly the authorities pertinent to determining the lawful role
of the military in a domestic terrorist attack on September 10, 2001.
Drawing on the smallpox scenario, I will then assess changes in the
military role after September 11. Particular attention will be paid to
the problems created by a public health emergency and attendant law
enforcement and civil disturbance concerns. In a concluding
section, obstacles to constructing an appropriate and measured role
for the military in counterterrorism preparedness will be addressed
briefly.
I. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
DOMESTIC TERRORISM ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2001
A. From Technical and Informational Assistance to Direct Law
Enforcement
As the text of the PCA suggests and interpreting case law
confirms, a wide range of military activities are not restricted by the
Act because the activities do not constitute "execut[ing] the laws."
Reviewing courts have employed criteria for measuring whether
domestic military activities constitute "executing the laws" that ask,
for example, whether the use of the military was "direct" and
"active;" whether the military "pervaded the activities" of law
enforcement; and whether the military personnel was applied to
citizens in ways that were "regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory."32  In general, the provision by the military of
equipment, communications, reconnaissance and intelligence, and
transport has been determined not to violate the PCA.33
In addition, a range of information-sharing authorities exist,
including an express permission for armed forces personnel to share
intelligence acquired during military operations for law enforcement
in the United States before enactment of the PCA. Nor will it assess the
constitutionality of the PCA or any such restriction on the President's constitutional
powers. These issues, along with analyses of the meaning of the PCA and its
statutory exceptions, have been addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., William C. Banks,
Troops Defending the Homeland: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Legal
Environment for a Military Role in Domestic Counter Terrorism, 14 Terrorism &
Pol. Violence 1 (2002); Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus Act: A
Principle in Need of Renewal, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 953 (1997); David Engdahl,
Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil
Disorders, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1971).
32. See Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 358-59.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994); Hayes v.
Hawes, 921 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891
(D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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purposes.34 The permission is extended, however, only where the
intelligence is acquired in conducting an operation for military
purposes. Similar authorities permit the armed forces to train police
on how to use equipment, and to provide "expert advice" relevant to
the training.35 Military equipment may also be provided for civilian
use. 36 These authorities may not be exercised to undermine military
readiness, 37 the civilians must pay for what they receive, 38 and the
DoD must promulgate regulations to clarify that armed forces
personnel may not directly make arrests or conduct searches and
seizures "when supporting civilian law enforcement."39 Curiously,
the regulations, promulgated for years in the Code of Federal
Regulations,40 now appear only in a Defense Department Directive.
The Directive forbids certain forms of direct military assistance to
civilian law enforcement, specifically including interdiction of a
means of transport, search or seizure, arrest or detention, and
surveillance,41 although the authorizing legislation states that these
limits apply unless "otherwise authorized by law."42 By regulation,
the DoD evaluates requests to support civilian law enforcement
including "acts or threats of terrorism" by considering the legality
of the request for support, the potential for lethal use of force, the
risks to DoD forces, the costs of the assistance and impact on the
DoD budget, the appropriateness of the operation to the DoD
mission, and the impact of the request on DoD's ability to perform
its principal missions.43
At least since 1995, federal government planning documents
have directed the DoD to develop capabilities to respond to threats
or acts of WMD terrorism, including terrorism involving nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons. 4  Some of the contemplated
support described in the planning documents is clearly technical and
informational, while other activities may involve law enforcement
34. 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2001).
35. Id. §§ 371, 373.
36. Id. §§ 372-373.
37. Id. § 376.
38. Id. § 377.
39. Id. § 375.
40. 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(3) (July 1, 1992) (removed by 58 Fed. Reg. 25776
(April 28, 1993)).
41. Dep't of Defense Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials, Encl. 4, § E4.1.3 (Jan. 15, 1986) [hereinafter DoD Directive
5525.5].
42. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.1-215.10 (2000).
43. Dep't of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civilian
Authorities § 4.2 (Feb. 18, 1997) [hereinafter DoD Directive 3025.15].
44. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism,
(official abstract available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdd-39.htm).
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and even war fighting. Under federal planning guidance
promulgated in 2000, the DoD is tasked to
provide assistance... [to the lead federal agency] during all
aspects of a terrorist incident."45 Among the tasks assigned
are the following: "[t]hreat assessment; [emergency support
team] participation and transportation; technical advice;
operational support; tactical support; support for civil
disturbances; custody, transportation and disposal of a WMD
device; and other capabilities including mitigation of the
consequences of a release.46
Threat assessment and the provision of technical advice do not
directly involve law enforcement and are thus outside the reach of the
PCA, whether or not specifically exempted by statute. However, the
other items in the list may involve doing what civilian law
enforcement otherwise does, and some tasks could clearly go beyond
law enforcement to war fighting depending on the nature of the
incident, the gravity of the situation, and the continuing nature of the
crisis. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), lead
federal agency (LFA) for response to domestic terrorism incidents
during the crisis phase in 2001, anticipated situations where military
assistance to civilian law enforcement could be sought, including
terrorism incidents, to provide technical support, to interdict an event
and apprehend those responsible, to restore law and order following
an incident, and to abate the consequences of a terrorist act.47 The
planning directives are not statutes or their legal equivalent; they
simply describe activities that are otherwise authorized. These latter
assignments fell squarely within the prohibition of the PCA unless
they were exempted by statute or the Constitution. The Fiscal Year
2000 DoD Authorization Act permitted the Secretary to "provide
assistance to civil authorities in responding to an act of terrorism or
threat of an act of terrorism '48 although the authority to "provide
assistance" may not extend to direct law enforcement. However,
several more specific laws described in the next section may provide
the authority contemplated in the plans.
45. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of
Operations Plan, available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/conplan/conplan.pdf
[hereinafter CONPLAN].
46. Id. at 4.
47. Memorandum to the Attorney General, from Randolph D. Moss, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,
Re: Federal Legal Authorities for Use in an Incident Involving Nuclear, Biological,
or Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (May 12, 2000). [hereinafter Federal
Legal Authorities].
48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
65, § 1023, 113 Stat. 512, 747 (1999).
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B. The Stafford Act
The Stafford Act4 9 is the contemporary title for the authority
originating in 1803 that permits the President to support state and
local governments following a major disaster. At a governor's
request, the President may employ the military to provide support
"essential for the preservation of life and property,"5 ° for up to ten
days in the immediate aftermath of an incident involving "any fire,
flood, or explosion" that causes "damages of sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance."51 Strictly speaking,
a WMD event could only be a "major disaster" if it produced a fire,
flood, or explosion. However, the Stafford Act also permits the
President to declare a state of emergency when he determines that
federal support of state and local authorities is required "to save lives
and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States."52
A major WMD terrorist incident could surely constitute an
emergency or a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act. President
Clinton invoked the Stafford Act in response to the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing,53 and President Bush relied on the Act in declaring a
major disaster following the September 11, 2001, attack on the
World Trade Center.54
Although the authority conferred by the Stafford Act is sweeping,
its essence is disaster relief. The Act does permit the President to
declare an emergency, but not a major disaster, on his own initiative
where the emergency "involves a subject area for which, under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the United States
exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority, 55 and
the DoD may provide "emergency work" essential for the
preservation of life and property for a maximum of ten days before
the declaration of an emergency or disaster.56 Military personnel
would be engaged in "efforts to save lives, protect property and
public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a
49. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000).
50. Id. § 5170(b).
51. Id. § 5122(2). The 1988 amendments to the Stafford Act clarify that the
authorities are not limited to "natural catastrophes," but apply "regardless of cause."
See H.R. Rep. No. 100-517, at 4 (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6085, 6088.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2000).
53. Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,819 (May 3,
1995).
54. Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,682 (Sept. 21,
2001).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2000).
56. Id. § 5170b(c).
2004]
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catastrophe,"57 including law enforcement activities that may
otherwise be proscribed by the PCA.
C. The Insurrection Act
Upon enactment of the PCA in 1878, the Insurrection Act
58
constituted one longstanding express exception to the PCA. As
currently codified, the Insurrection Act confers authority for the
President to use the military to undertake a range of actions
domestically, including law enforcement. 59 There is little doubt that
the Insurrection Act could support a military role in homeland
defense in the event of a catastrophic terrorist incident. One section
dates from 1792 and the Whiskey Rebellion and permits the President
to use the military to suppress "an insurrection"'6 at the request of a
state government. Another section permits the President to determine
when "unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or
rebellion.., make it impracticable to enforce the laws."'" If he so
determines, the President may federalize the National Guard and/or
use "such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce
[the] laws or to suppress the rebellion., 62 The third section permits
the President to use the armed forces or Guard to suppress any
"insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy" 63 if law enforcement is hindered within a state, and local
law enforcement is unable to protect individuals, or if the unlawful
action "obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or
impedes the course of justice under those laws."'
Over the long history of the Insurrection Act, Presidents have
relied on their authorities to break the Pullman Strike in 1894, to
enforce school desegregation decrees,65  and to quiet civil
disturbances in several cities, such as after the Rodney King verdict
in Los Angeles.' The language of the Act is broad enough to permit
the President to order military forces, Guard or regular, on his own
or at the request of a state to respond to a terrorist incident in the
United States. The terrorist incident or its aftermath would constitute
57. Id. § 5192(a)(1).
58. Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 331.
61. Id. § 332.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 333.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); Exec. Order
No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957).
66. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 6427,57 Fed. Reg. 19,359 (1992); Exec. Order
No. 12,804, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,361 (1992).
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the "conspiracy" or "unlawful combination" that would cause
"domestic violence" of such a magnitude to hinder enforcement of
the laws. The disturbance could develop from the panic and unrest
that may attend an outbreak of unknown origins or magnitude, or
from efforts by state and local law enforcement personnel to enforce
restrictions on movement or quarantine, for example.
In exercising the Insurrection Act authorities, the President must
first issue a Proclamation to Disperse, commanding all persons
engaged in domestic violence in the area affected to cease and desist
and to leave the area. Then the President would issue an executive
order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to use military force to
suppress the activities described in the proclamation. The executive
order would prescribe rules of engagement and rules for the use of
force, and would require that the DoD coordinate its law enforcement
activities with the Attorney General.67 Although the Insurrection Act
confers broad authorities, the Act has never been invoked, nor its
procedures employed, in a situation of mass casualties.
D. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Authorities
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act. Pursuant to authority in this Act, the DoD has
developed and maintains thirty-five rapid response teams trained to
aid federal, state, and local officials in responding to an attack with
weapons of mass destruction. The response teams form the Joint
Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), designed to respond to state-
generated requests for assistance in the consequence management
stage of a terrorist incident. Since 1999, the JTF-CS has prepared to
deploy to a WMD incident site and assume command and control of
all responding military forces in support of a civilian lead federal
agency. In addition to providing agent assessment and
communications capabilities, JTF-CS is designed to provide planning
and logistics capabilities, and broad-based support in response
operations in contaminated environments.
For terrorism involving the use of nuclear material, Congress has
authorized the Attorney General to seek Defense Department law
enforcement assistance, including search and arrest authority, when
the Attorney General and the Secretary agree that an "emergency
situation" is present, and the assistance will not limit military
67. See Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 367-368; see also Dep't
of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances
(MACDIS) (Feb. 4, 1994); Federal Legal Authorities, supra note 47; Jeffrey D.
Brake, Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management:
Background and Issues for Congress (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 30-938, 2001).
68. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2367 (Supp. V 1999).
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readiness. 69 An "emergency situation" exists where there is a serious
threat to the United States, where law enforcement would be
seriously impaired if DoD assistance were not provided, and civilian
personnel cannot enforce the law.7°
Parallel authority exists in the event of an "emergency situation"
involving biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.7'
These authorities extend to "any weapon or device that [can] cause
death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people"72
through the release of chemicals, germs, or radiation. In addition to
meeting the conditions required before assistance is provided in the
event of an incident involving nuclear materials, DoD assistance in
terrorist incidents involving biological or chemical weapons requires
that the assistance be "considered necessary for the immediate
protection of human life., 73 The triggering definition of "emergency
situation" also mirrors the definition for a nuclear incident with only
slight variations in language.
11. NORMALIZATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The emergence of counter terrorism laws and policies that
anticipate domestic military operations has undoubtedly pushed the
posse comitatus principle to a less prominent position in prescribing
the military role in domestic law enforcement. With the recent
attention given to homeland defense, it may be reasonable to ask
whether the exceptions to posse comitatus have swallowed the rule.
However, the PCA continues to reflect a long-standing policy that
military personnel do not conduct law enforcement activities in the
United States. To what extent has the policy changed after
September 11 ? In light of recent reforms that anticipate a greater
DoD role in homeland defense, and continuing assertions of broad
constitutional authority for the President to respond to acts of
terrorism, the next section of this article revisits the smallpox
scenario introduced in the introduction and assesses a future attack
with germs. If a smallpox attack occurs, or one like it, what will
military personnel do?
69. 18 U.S.C. § 831(e) (2000).
70. Id.
71. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2001).
72. 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (Supp. IV 1998). 18 U.S.C. § 229E provides similar
authorities in the event of a chemical weapons emergency even when the chemical
weapon is not a weapon of mass destruction. The broad definition of WMD-
capable of injuring "a significant number of people"-may render this authority
relatively meaningless.
73. 10 U.S.C. § 382(d)(2)(B)(i) (2001).
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A. Future Planning for a Military Role in Law Enforcement in
Homeland Defense: The Smallpox Scenario Revisited
Assume that it is September 25, 2001. The smallpox outbreak
has worsened. Thousands of cases with symptoms are flooding local
hospitals, and the crisis has spread on at least two fronts. Preliminary
reports indicate that reload may have occurred-emerging incidence
of smallpox symptoms suggest that attacks have been carried out in
other major cities in the United States. Meanwhile, the delayed onset
of the first identified smallpox cases has spread the contagion around
the United States and to other nations, as exposed travelers moved
through and out of the infected areas in the first days after the
original attacks. Although transmission rates for this highly
communicable disease vary considerably based on the dynamics of
the outbreak, rough estimates are that by the time the outbreak is
recognized, second-generation exposure will produce about ten new
cases for every initial case.74
Public health and emergency response resources in the New York
City and Washington, D.C. areas have been exhausted and
demoralized by the magnitude of their tasks. Isolation of cases has
proven impossible; no hospitals or similar facilities could be made
available for that purpose on such short notice. Nor was contact
tracing accomplished following the initial outbreaks; time was too
short. When the smallpox outbreak was confirmed a few days
earlier, efforts to begin vaccinations faltered. Only a small
percentage of the first responders in the infected areas had been
vaccinated against smallpox, and, partly because of concerns over the
privacy of medical information, no mass screening had been done in
the affected areas to determine which persons are ineligible for the
vaccine due to immune system weaknesses, skin conditions, or other
issues.
A range of vaccination strategies would also have been debated
and begun. The attempts to isolate cases and contacts and then ring
vaccinate and contain the disease around New York and Washington,
D.C. would fail to confine the outbreak because infected carriers had
already traveled outside of the originally targeted area before the
outbreak was confirmed. Follow-on efforts at voluntary mass
vaccination would also come up short as distribution of the vaccine
would encounter logistical problems working from centralized sites;
thousands of persons within the originally affected areas would
decline the vaccination, and those who were ineligible for the vaccine
would become infected and would begin spreading the disease.
74. Tara O'Toole, Michael Mair, and Thomas V. Inglesby, Shining Light on
"Dark Winter," 34 Clinical Infectious Diseases 972, 975 (2002).
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Various containment strategies would have been considered by
federal, state, and local officials, including quarantine and closure of
public facilities and gatherings. Local leaders would resolve to stem
the crisis by imposing quarantines and curfews, along with closure
orders on mass transit and other public places, to halt the further
spread of the disease and to quell rising civil disorder. However, the
mayors and governors have also been conferring regularly with the
President. Believing that only federal authority can quell this crisis,
the President would be advised by senior federal agency officials that
the only way to contain the spread of the epidemic is to shut down all
places of assembly, theaters, shopping malls, sports stadiums,
businesses-in effect, everything. The President favors a national
vaccination program managed by federal officials. To insure an
orderly containment, and to provide personnel to help manage the
vaccination program, the President is considering federalizing the
National Guard throughout the United States.
Twenty days after the initial exposure, there are 100,000 reported
smallpox cases from twenty states and four other nations, 20,000 are
dead, and thousands more are dying. Travel restrictions are causing
additional problems, and Canada and Mexico have closed their
United States' borders. Food shortages are cropping up as travel
problems and store closings worsen the growing sense of panic.
Public affairs officers have sought to reassure the public that the
outbreak will be confined and will pass with fewer consequences if
the populace does not panic and cooperates with orders to stay home
and to refrain from attempting to travel or flee an infected area.
However, as media reports of casualties and new smallpox cases in
a widening array of places mounts, widespread panic and disorder is
occurring.
If events spin this far out of control, the Mayor, Governor, or
President could call for armed military intervention-to manage a
vaccination program, to enforce quarantine or relocation orders, to
maintain curfew, to command local resources or facilities, to take or
destroy property, and to enforce roadblocks and the closure of air,
rail, and other transit centers. Deployed military units could also
seek to apprehend, detain, or shoot to kill those who perpetrated the
outbreak, but military personnel may also be tasked with search,
75. Dep't of Defense Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying
of Weapons by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties
(Nov. 11, 2001) [hereinafter DoD Directive 5210.56], permits the use of deadly
force under "conditions of extreme necessity" when lesser means will not suffice,
there is no significant increase in the risk of harm to innocent persons, and the
purpose is defensive, to protect sensitive assets, to protect persons from serious
harm, to protect public health or safety, or to effect an arrest or apprehension or
prevent escape. Id. Encl. 2, E.2.1.2.
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arrest, and detention of any persons who violate a curfew or
quarantine restriction, who attempt to breach a roadblock to escape
the outbreak area, or who attempt to loot or otherwise take
advantage of the breakdown in civil authority. Other armed tactical
units would be deployed to root out those who have threatened
additional attacks.
Regardless of the legal structures for responding to a domestic
terrorist attack, the reality is that the incidents are local, not state or
federal, at least at the outset. In the scenario sketched here, local
and state decision makers would undoubtedly have called upon
federal assistance once the existence of the smallpox attacks was
verified. The Governor of New York and Mayor of Washington,
D.C. would have deployed the CST and National Guard units to
assist in emergency response activities. As will be reviewed in the
next two subsections, the operations plan, once a biological attack
has been suspected and then verified, would become more complex
and legally and practically problematic.
B. Impact of New Structures, Policies, and Laws
September 1 1 and the aftermath war on terrorism generated an
array of new plans, policies, and laws that affect the potential
military role in responding to a domestic terrorism incident. Within
days of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, Congress
passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to "use all
necessary and appropriate force" against those responsible for
September 1 1 "in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such .. .persons. 76 No
geographic or time limit was placed on the authority granted, and the
authorization to "prevent any future acts" raises the possibility that
domestic military activities could take place for the foreseeable
future.
For the first time since the Civil War, our government authorized
a wartime battlefield that could include our cities. Although the
lawfulness of the war fighting dimensions of the resolution are
beyond the scope of this article, by implication the resolution also
contemplates that there may be new law enforcement roles for the
military, incident to the use of force against terrorists or in
mitigating a terrorist attack on the homeland. A few weeks later,
Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act." Among other
76. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
77. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
enhancements to authorities to combat terrorism in the homeland,
the PATRIOT Act assured that the military may respond to requests
for assistance involving weapons of mass destruction besides
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.78
In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was created79 in
a massive restructuring of government functions and agencies. The
National Security Strategy of the United States and National
Strategy for Homeland Security8 ° were announced by President
Bush, both of which emphasized the increasingly important role of
the military in protecting the homeland from terrorism. The National
Strategy for Homeland Security called for "a concerted national
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States ... and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."'
a8
However, the strategy documents do not further specify military
roles and missions, nor do they sort between possible war fighting
and support to civil authorities. Meanwhile, since 2002 and ongoing
today, the Administration has reshaped and refined federal planning
for homeland security preparedness, including planning for
managing a major terrorist attack on the homeland.
In February 2003, President Bush promulgated Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) 2 to "enhance the ability
of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a
single, comprehensive national incident management system.
83
Where prior plans treated crisis management and consequence
management as discrete functions, with different lead agencies and
decision structures, HSPD-5 characterizes domestic terrorism
incidents as a single phenomenon, subject to the overall direction of
the Secretary for Homeland Security, although the FBI retains lead
authority for criminal investigations of domestic terrorist attacks.84
The Secretary's responsibilities are triggered when a federal agency
acting under its own authority has requested Department of
Homeland Security assistance; when state and local resources are
overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by state and
78. Id. § 104, 115 Stat. at 272.
79. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
80. National Security Council, The White House, National Security Strategy
of the United States of America, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html; Homeland Security, supra note 18.
81. Homeland Security, supra note 18.
82. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic
Incidents (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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local authorities; when more than one federal agency has become
involved in responding to the incident; or when the President directs
the Secretary to assume management responsibility of the incident.85
The centerpiece of the post-September 11 homeland security
plan is the establishment of a single National Response Plan (NRP),
designed as an "all-discipline, all-hazards" approach to all federal
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. 6 The NRP
includes twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), described in
annexes to the Federal Response Plan that supply details on the
mission, policies, concept of operations, and responsibilities of the
federal agencies involved in providing support to state and local
agencies. 7 To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Homeland
Security will administer a National Incident Management System
(NIMS) designed to permit federal, state, and local entities to work
effectively together. The NIMS will include systems, command
control, and communications devices that provide for interoperability
and compatibility among the different agencies working to anticipate
or respond to a domestic terrorism incident.88
As part of the implementation of the Homeland Security Act, the
Secretary of Defense created a new Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense (ASD/HD) whose principal duty is the overall supervision
of the homeland defense activities of the DoD. In effect, the New
ASD/HD becomes the Pentagon's Domestic Crisis Manager, and the
advent of the new Assistant Secretary position transfers from military
to civilian control the Department's policy oversight of military
support for homeland defense.89 Along with the ASD/HD, the
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) coordinates DoD civil support
activities as the on-scene representative with the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO), the lead Department of Homeland
Security representative on-scene. Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers (EPLOs) are charged by the Services and other DoD
agencies to plan, coordinate, and implement support to civil
authorities, subject to chain of command orders.9"
During a crisis and subject to the still-evolving NRP and NIMS,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would coordinate the
85. Id.
86. Id. Still a work in progress at this writing, the status of a variety of existing
response plans will be determined when the NRP is completed.
87. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Office of the General Counsel,
Domestic WMD Incident Management Legal Deskbook 3-8-3-9 (2003) [hereinafter
WMD Incident Management Deskbook].
88. Id.; see also id. at 3-15-16.
89. See Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments,
Implementation Guidance Regarding the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense (Mar. 25, 2003).
90. WMD Incident Management Deskbook, supra note 87, at 2-39-2-40.
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federal response. If DHS officials determine that military personnel
could provide technical support to law enforcement or crisis response
personnel, or that the military could interdict the terrorist event and
apprehend the terrorists, the on-site DHS commander, or FCO, may
request military support from the DCO-the senior defense official
at the Site,9' after the Attorney General has requested DoD assistance
in enforcing the laws, through the EPLO. Once deployed, the EPLO
relinquishes command and military units remain under the military
chain of command. If state-deployed National Guard units are
already active in the crisis, possibly including Civil Support Teams,
existing authorities do not prescribe the federal-state relationship or
the command and control structures that may be necessary to
coordinate the military activities.
Acting pursuant to the special statutory authority for responding
to WMD terrorism, the DoD may supply technical assistance in the
form of equipment, facilities, or personnel.9" Depending on the crisis
setting and on the particular technical assistance provided, the federal
statute that permits the assistance may constitute an exception to or
may be read as not falling within the prohibition of the PCA. The
Secretary of Defense, following DoD Guidelines, must approve the
support requested.93
The same statutes permit the DoD to provide direct, operational
law enforcement assistance. Once approved by the Secretary,
military units plan and implement their support, subject to military
command. When providing technical support, military personnel
will not normally be armed and are authorized to use force only in
self-defense.94 Once deployed in such a situation, military assistance
to law enforcement personnel may include providing advice on the
technical aspects of locating, identifying, disabling, and transporting
a suspected WMD; containing or otherwise rendering safe a
suspected WMD that is not weaponized, or, upon approval of the
National Command Authority, doing the same with a suspected
WMD; questioning suspects with law enforcement personnel when
necessary to learn more about the WMD device; and supplying and
operating equipment or vehicles. 95 In addition, military personnel
may conduct searches during such an emergency when there is
91. DoD Directive 3025.15, supra note 43, § 4.7.1., Immediate Response
(1997). This "immediate response" authority may include rescue, evacuation,
emergency medical treatment, restoration of essential public services, control of
roadways and food and supplies distribution, and facilitating reestablishment of
civil government functions. Id. §§ 4.5.4.1-10.
92. 10U.S.C. § 382 (2001).
93. DoD Directive 3025.15, supra note 43, § 4.4.
94. DoD Directive 5210.56, supra note 75, § 4.1. See CONPLAN,
95. See CONPLAN, Supra note 45, at 4.
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suspicion that an area may contain WMD and trained law
enforcement personnel are unavailable.96
In the aftermath of a WMD terrorist incident, coordination among
agencies and levels of government may become highly complex.
Although federal statutes supply authority for federal personnel,
civilian and military, to take various actions in such an instance,
including some law enforcement tasks, the laws do not authorize
federal control over state and local personnel. Some authorities
authorize the President to "coordinate" assistance, including
coordination with state and local governments.97 However, the
President's efforts to "coordinate" would not include prescriptive
authority. In addition, the Constitution has been construed by the
Supreme Court not to permit the national government to compel state
and local officials to implement federal law. 98  It is at least
conceivable that a governor could disagree or have different
objectives concerning the provision of military support in a domestic
terrorism crisis. If he persists, the President would be obligated
legally to order federal military forces into local law enforcement
roles based on constitutional powers or pursuant to the Insurrection
Act.
If a tactical military force were deployed to respond to a domestic
terrorism crisis, the deployment decision would be based on a
determination that public safety could not be assured by civilian law
enforcement capabilities, or that a hostile attack threatens the
continuity of government, If a tactical force is engaged during a
hostile attack, the necessary military response is well within the
President's Article H1 authority to repel attacks. However, the
Insurrection Act may permit the President to circumvent the PCA
restrictions and deploy a tactical force for law enforcement purposes
when widespread, unlawful activities "make it impracticable to
enforce the laws of the United States," or when violence "hinders the
execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within
that State." 99 The order for military deployment could follow the
cease and desist proclamation and executive order steps outlined
above, even where not sought or resisted by a governor or state
legislature. After invoking the Insurrection Act authorities, the
President could decide to make available to the Department of
Homeland Security on-site leadership through its National Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC), military units as part of an
Interagency Incident Management Group (11MG), or an interagency
96. DoD Directive 5525.5, super note 41, Encl. 4, § E4.3.2.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a); 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(2).
98. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
99. 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-333 (2001).
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team tasked to advise and support the Department of Homeland
Security in crisis management.
One of the most difficult and contentious issues surrounding any
future role for the military in law enforcement during a domestic
terrorism crisis concerns the rules of engagement that would govern
the actions taken by armed members of the military. On the one
hand, the prospect of calling in the military to supplement or to
supplant traditional civilian law enforcement in a crisis indicates that
law enforcement is not up to the task, because, for example, a
terrorist organization armed with lethal weapons of mass destruction
may overwhelm civilian capabilities. Civilian law enforcement
capabilities are not designed to match a paramilitary assault on the
homeland, especially one that employs weapons of mass destruction.
On the other hand, deploying military units in such situations brings
with it a tradition of shooting to kill. Unless otherwise trained and
equipped, soldiers will be used as they have traditionally been trained
with military rules of engagement, and not with the traditional law
enforcement rules where deadly force may be used only in self-
defense or defense of other agents in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm."° The military personnel will be obligated to
sort combatants from others, likely on the spur of the moment, to
make assessments about the use of deadly force on the same basis,
and to treat the provocation as an act of war, with attendant
consequences. Even if trained in law enforcement rules and
techniques, in the heat of the moment, military personnel may default
to their base training orientation and culture.
Following the riots that erupted after the verdict in the Rodney
King trial in Los Angeles in 1992, the Joint Task Force of Los
Angeles implemented for the first time The DoD Civil Disturbance
Plan (GARDEN PLOT).I"I Among its rules of engagement (ROE)
are the following: minimum force must be used at all times when
responding to civil disturbances; warning shots are not permitted;
deadly force may be used only if lesser means have been exhausted
or are unavailable, the risk of harm to bystanders is not significantly
increased, and the purpose is self defense, prevention of serious
crime, destruction of vital public health or safety, or to prevent the
100. See DoD Directive 5210.56, supra note 75.
101. U.S. Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT),
Annex C (Concept of Operation) (1991). The rules were modified by Message,
161639Z Jul 96, Director of Military Support, subject: Changes to DoD Civil
Disturbance Plan-"GARDEN PLOT," (16 July 1996). Center for Law and
Military Operations, Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge
Advocates 70 n.75 (2001) [hereinafter DOPLAW Handbook].
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escape of a person who is a serious threat to persons or property. 102
Although these rules of engagement were written to apply following
an Insurrection Act proclamation and are thus not subject to the PCA,
the rules of engagement emphasize that military personnel should
provide support to civilian officials, leaving law enforcement tasks
to state and local authorities whenever possible.' °3
Beyond the organizational change to add an Assistant Secretary
for Homeland Defense and the potentially broad assignment of
homeland defense responsibilities in the National Strategy document,
the military civil support role is unchanged by the new structures,
laws, and policies. Indeed, in the Homeland Security Act, Congress
"reaffirmed the continued importance" of the PCA, and noted that it
"has served the Nation well in limiting the use of the Armed Forces
to enforce the law."'" Progress has clearly been made in fleshing out
the rules for a military role in law enforcement during a terrorist
incident. Still, the affirmation of the PCA and the availability of the
DoD Civil Disturbance Plan rules of engagement only begin to
prescribe the new normal. What exactly will troops do in the event
of an attack with biological weapons? How will the activities of the
civilian and military entities responding to a biological weapons
attack be phased, and subject to whose leadership? How will the
federal players and roles, however they are phased, be coordinated
with state and local responders, and subject to whose leadership?
Even more nettlesome issues crop up when a potential biological
weapons attack is examined closely.
Combining the new authorities and plans with pre-existing ones,
the key variables governing the military role in homeland security are
these:
• The National Strategy for Homeland Security assigns to
the military the role of protecting the homeland, and a
new civilian Assistant Secretary was created to manage
the military homeland defense roles;
* The evolving NRP and NIM4S do not clearly prescribe
military tasks;
• Existing authorities do not establish the relationships or
command and control arrangements between state and
federal military troops;
• Special statutory authorities for WMD permit troops to
provide technical assistance and direct law enforcement;
102. DOPLAW Handbook, supra note 101, at 70-72.
103. Id.
104. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 886, 116 Stat.
2135, 2248 (2002).
7572004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* Insurrection Act procedures allow the President to order
troops to enforce the laws;
* Rules of engagement exist to prescribe military roles only
when the Insurrection Act has been invoked.
C. Controlling People: The Military Role in Enforcing
Quarantine or Travel and Movement Restrictions, Vaccination
Programs, and Related Disorder
In the event of a terrorist attack involving a contagious biological
agent or radiation, officials may determine either to restrict or force
movement of persons in order to limit the spread of the contagion and
to preserve order. Public health management would be a critically
important function of government in such a situation. But which
level of government is responsible for making and enforcing the
decisions? The decision to quarantine or otherwise restrict the
movement of persons for public health reasons is undeniably a
creature of state law in our federal system. Some states have revised
state public health and emergency management authorities in
response to the threats of a biological weapons attack. However,
states generally are not well prepared for such a contingency, and the
federal support authorities are also not adequate. 105
The Surgeon General is authorized to and has promulgated
regulations "necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or
spread of communicable diseases" from foreign nations into states,
or from one state to another. 0 6 In turn, the President specifies by
executive order the diseases that could trigger this limited quarantine
authority.0 7 Assuming a terrorist attack with biological weapons,' °8
federal authorities may be invoked if the agent transmits one of the
communicable diseases covered by existing regulations.'0 9 For
instance, smallpox is covered. Any person "reasonably believed to
be infected with a communicable disease in a communicable stage"
may be stopped and examined if he is or is about to move from state
to state, or if he is "a probable source" of infection to others who will
105. WMD Incident Management Deskbook, supra note 87, at 4-14-4-17
(describing The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), its partial
adoption in 32 states, and uneven state law).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000).
107. Id. § 264(b).
108. An attack by chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons would not trigger
federal quarantine authorities unless the spread of a communicable disease is
considered likely due to the effects on immune systems from the primary attack.
109. 21 C.F.R. § 1240.3 (2004) (defining communicable disease). See also
Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17255 (Apr. 4, 2003) (listing several
diseases, including smallpox).
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be so moving. "0 However, no existing federal regulations permit the
detention or other regulation of persons once identified as
communicable to prevent the spread of a disease."' Nor are there
federal regulations authorizing the imposition of quarantine
following an attack by chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons." 2
Thus, unless domestic quarantine regulations are promulgated, no
federal quarantine may be lawfully imposed except at our
international borders." 3 Moreover, principles of federalism and
constitutional limits on the exercise of federal regulatory authority
may not permit a federal quarantine within a single state. "
Even if quarantine regulations are promulgated, neither the
Surgeon General and the Department of Health and Human Services
nor the Centers for Disease Control have police forces that could
enforce quarantine. One analysis of a federal exercise involving a
fictional biological weapons attack in Denver offered a sobering
assessment of the quarantine enforcement problem:
[L]ocal officials.., believed that the public would probably
not cooperate with compulsory orders to commandeer
property, restrict movement of people, or forcibly remove
them to designated locations. . . . [C]itizens get angry at
forced evacuations for such visible calamities as hurricanes,
floods, and wildfires, not to mention a stay-at-home order for
a microscopic killer that they may doubt is in their midst.
Police also questioned whether their colleagues would
recognize the authority of the public health officer to declare
a quarantine or would even stick around to enforce the order.
... [S]ome wondered whether there were enough local and
state police to quarantine a large metropolitan area in the
first place. . . . [One police captain stated] if police officers
knew that a biological agent had been released, ninety-nine
110. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1) (2000).
111. Regulations do permit such detention of persons entering the United States
from abroad. 42 C.F.R. § 71.32 (2004).
112. Although contamination from these sources may not be a "communicable
disease" within the statute, federal authority may exist to prevent the transmission
of disease that could occur as secondary effects of the contamination.
113. Federal Legal Authorities, supra note 47.
114. See National Commission on Terrorism, supra note 10, at 27. In United
States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down an act of Congress as exceeding
the Commerce Clause authority for the first time in nearly sixty years. 514
U.S.549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), Although the Court stated that Congress may
"regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce," Id.
at 555, 115 S. Ct. At 1627, it has also ruled that Congress may not regulate non-
economic activities within a state solely on the basis of the effect of those activities
on interstate commerce. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000).
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percent of the cops would not be here. They would grab
their families and leave.115
Depending on the level of force required to enforce the quarantine,
armed military may be necessary for law enforcement purposes. Most
state laws make violating quarantine a misdemeanor, creating the
quintessential law enforcement action. The PCA and DoD directives
forbid direct military involvement in law enforcement. However,
federal assistance, including military support, may be provided to
enforce state and local quarantines after the invocation of the
Insurrection Act, or pursuant to a governor's request or presidential
determination under the Stafford Act."16 On the one hand, absent an
Insurrection Act event, federal military forces arguably could,
consistent with the PCA and DoD directives, provide support to civil
authorities in the form of communications, movement of essential
personnel in or out of a quarantine area, marking a quarantine
perimeter, moving persons out of the quarantine area for health or
safety reasons, and providing mass vaccinations in voluntary lines." 7
On the other hand, even activities as relatively non-invasive as traffic
control when traffic lights are not operating is a law enforcement
function that could not be performed by federalized Guard or regular
military'18 unless the Insurrection Act procedures are followed.
States may apply quarantine restrictions incident to their generic
police power, " so long as they do not exceed what is "necessary for
[the state's] self-protection. 20 The state quarantine could restrict any
individual's constitutional right to travel only on the basis of finding
that the quarantine is necessary to serve a compelling interest."
115. Amy E. Smithson & Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and
Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response 269-270 & n.225, (Henry L.
Stimson Ctr. Rep. No. 35, 2000).
116. See, e.g., The Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (2001); supra text
accompanying notes 59 to 67; 42 U.S.C. § 243(a)(2000) (authorizing HHS
cooperation with state and local authorities); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170,5192-5193,5195a
(2000) (authorizing federal assistance to state and local public health officials in
emergency situations).
117. See Lt. Col. Stephen Parke, Legal Lessons Learned From Blue Advance-02,
Journal of Homeland Security 12 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/blue-advance.htrnl.
118. Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 373.
119. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,25,25 S. Ct. 358,361 (1905); Compagnie
Francaise v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387, 22 S. Ct. 811, 814 (1902);
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973).
120. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471-472 (1877).
121. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,500-502, 119 S. Ct. 1518,1524-25 (1999)
(reviewing the legacy of the constitutional right to travel and the requirement that
compelling governmental interests be found before burdening the right); Smith v.
Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (upholding curfew in South Florida after
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However, civilian law enforcement personnel may not be able to
enforce the quarantine. A range of military assets could be deployed
to enforce a quarantine, and considerable uncertainty exists concerning
the appropriate military role and force configuration for quarantine
enforcement that could create potential conflicts or disagreements
among decision makers.
In the scenario described above, quarantine may not be a realistic
or helpful measure. With reload and multiple outbreaks, along with
delayed onset of smallpox and a highly mobile population, an even
slightly ineffective or "leaky" quarantine may be worse than no
quarantine at all. Further, enforcing quarantine in the circumstances
described here-widespread disorder and an out-of-control
outbreak-could create enforcement problems that no one wants to
confront (do soldiers shoot families that breach a roadblock in their
SUV?).
More likely officials would resort to a mass vaccination campaign.
With an outbreak of this magnitude, only mass vaccination can
immunize sufficient numbers of people to keep services functioning
and avoid unwieldy and unenforceable quarantine. Like quarantine,
vaccination is a public health policy that is reserved to the states and
their police powers.'2 2  Also like quarantine, even mandatory
vaccination programs are lawful so long as appropriate flexibility is
permitted for those with constitutionally compelled reasons for an
exemption. As with other unexplored facets of a massive biological
weapons attack, however, the potential military roles in mass
vaccination have not been set out or even recommended. Would
military personnel be trained to give the shots? Do armed units guard
health care providers who are giving shots? Would the military be
deployed to manage a detention center for those who decline the
vaccination, and those who are ineligible to receive it? If vaccination
is mandatory, do armed military force the unwilling to be vaccinated,
and, if so, according to what rules for the use of force? Or will
military units prevent the unvaccinated from leaving their homes until
vaccinated?
What is known about the military role in restricting civilian
populations and in support of a mass vaccination program may be
summarized as follows:
Various aspects of quarantine enforcement by military
personnel may violate the PCA unless the Insurrection
Act procedures are invoked;
Hurricane Andrew) (abrogated by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (2004), on separate decision to recognize "hypothetical
jurisdiction).
122. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358.
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" Troops may support state and local civilians by providing
communications, transportation, and various public health
services, but may not enforce the laws unless pursuant to
the Insurrection Act;
* Many potential military roles have not been assigned, nor
have force configurations been determined, for enforcing
quarantine or like restrictions (Do military personnel
deliver food and medicine? Do they operate abandoned
public utility services?);
" Military roles are similarly unclear in support of a mass
vaccination program. May military force be used to seal
off an urban area? May troops manage a vaccination
program, voluntary or mandatory? What rules for the use
of force would apply?
D. The Role of the National Guard and Reserves
In one respect, the National Guard "solves" the problems
presented by domestic assignment of the armed forces to respond to
a terrorist attack. Particularly to the extent that a terrorist incident is
local and within one state, state deployed National Guard can provide
military-type law enforcement support to enforce quarantine, other
area restrictions, or curfews, and to distribute health or other
emergency supplies in support of civilian authorities. As a state
entity, not part of the armed forces of the United States, the PCA
presumably does not apply, and the tradition of keeping the armed
forces out of civilian law enforcement would not include the state
National Guard personnel.
The legal picture is not so clear, and the practical distinctions are
not so sharp, however. Whether the National Guard is "part" of the
Army or Air Force for purposes of the PCA depends on the status of
Guard personnel at a particular point in time. The National Guard
had its origins in the colonial militias. The Constitution respects the
citizen-soldier tradition of having homeland defense provided by the
local militia, and assures that the National Guard will serve as a state
force under the control of governors--except when federalized by the
President.'23 Congress can "provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions, '  and it "provide[s] for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as maybe employed in the service of the United States," 125 leaving
123. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 15.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 8, cl. 16.
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appointment of the officers to the states. The Supreme Court has
affirmed that the National Guard is a state entity unless called into
federal service.126 Thus, the National Guard may be the citizen-
soldier, subject to local control.1 27 Or the National Guard may be a
trained supplement to the regular military, prepared to fight and
destroy.
In 1933, Congress created the National Guard of the states and
the National Guard of the United States.128 Members belong both to
a state Guard and to the federal Guard, and are civilians when not in
their military status. 129  Later Congress created a separate Air
National Guard of the United States and limited the original federal
Guard to the Army component.13 Even when called into federal
service, members of the National Guard are not on "active duty," a
status limited to full-time active military service personnel."' State
laws typically authorize the Adjutant General, directed by the
Governor, to call up National Guard units in an emergency. When
not in federal service, federal law (typically known as Title 32)
requires that training, equipment, and inspection be supplied
according to federal requirements. 132
Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the Guard has become
an ever more frequent source of combat support. Once federalized,
National Guard personnel serve as reserves of the Army. 3 3 National
Guard personnel have also provided support to civil authorities after
natural disasters, including clean up after floods or storms, assisting
in fighting fires, and helping with evacuation and managing supplies.
The authority to order such support was transferred in 2003 from the
Secretary of the Army to a new Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense. 134
It is thus logically assumed that Guard personnel would be well
positioned to become involved in the event of a significant terrorist
attack in the United States. In 1998, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen expressly added response to chemical and biological weapons
terrorism as a new mission for the Guard.1 35 The new mission began
126. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 394, 110 S. Ct. 2447
(1990).
127. 32 U.S.C. § 325 (2002).
128. National Defense Act Amendments of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-64, 48 Stat.
153 (1933).
129. 10 U.S.C. § 101(c)(3) (2001); 32 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000).
130. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-476,66 Stat. 481,498,
501 (1952).
131. 10 U.S.C. § 10103 (2001).
132. 32 U.S.C. Chaps. 5, 7 (2000).
133. 10 U.S.C. § 12403 (2001).
134. See supra text accompanying note 89.
135. Defense Reform Initiative Directive No. 25, The Department of Defense
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in 1999 with the development of new Rapid Response and Initial
Detection (RAID) teams, configured to assist state and local
personnel in response to a terrorist attack. The specific missions of
the RAID teams were to identify a suspected chemical or biological
agent associated with a terrorist event, to track dispersal patterns and
evacuate victims, to control access to the site, to assist in bringing
other federal and state assets to a site, and to advise civilian
leaders. 136 After delays in training the RAID teams, the program was
modified and renamed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CST) in 2000. By late 2003, Congress had
authorized fifty-five WMD-CST teams, and the DoD certified thirty-
three as ready to assist in a WMD incident. 137 These teams consist of
twenty-two full-time National Guard personnel, who assess a WMD
event, advise civilian first responders on appropriate responses, and
facilitate introducing follow-on military support into the affected
area. 13  The primary function of the teams is to identify the
weapon/agent, and to supply communications with other federal,
state, and local agencies.
Whether as WMD-CSTs or otherwise, there can be little doubt
that Guard personnel are controlled by the PCA when in federal
service. Once federalized, Guard personnel are simply assimilated
into regular military forces, subject to the same chain of command,
rules of engagement, and DoD limits on their law enforcement
activities 139 as regular forces. It also seems clear, however, that
National Guard personnel under the control of a governor are not
subject to the PCA.1"° On the one hand, state militia were responsible
for much of the mischief that gave rise to the PCA, 14' and the Act
broadly regulates the military as "posse comitatus or otherwise." On
Plan for Integration of the National Guard and Reserve Component into Domestic
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Response (Jan. 26, 1998).
136. Dep't of Defense Tiger Team, Department of Defense Plan for Integrating
National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using
Weapons of Mass Destruction (January 1998), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/.
137. See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, 1 Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study on DoD Roles and
Missions in Homeland Security 75 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/homelandss.pdf [hereinafter DSB Study].
138. Id.
139. See DoD Directive No. 5525.5, supra note 41, Encl.4, § E4.2 (exempting
from the PCA proscriptions members of the National Guard when not in federal
service).
140. See United States v. Gilbert, 165 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1997).
141. State militia aided the federal marshal in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act.
See Robert W. Coakley, The Role of the Federal Military Forces in Domestic
Disorders 1789-1878 128-144 (1988).
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the other hand, as an outgrowth of the early state militias, the Guard
has also been a creature of state law since the Articles of
Confederation. This history, along with the default placement of the
National Guard as subordinate to the state governors, and the
principles of federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment, all point
to a reading of the PCA that does not reach the National Guard when
not federalized. In addition, numerous judicial decisions have arrived
at the same understanding,142 and various congressional reports have
concluded that the Guard is not subject to the PCA when not in
federal service. 4
3
However, uncertainty concerning the roles of and legal
restrictions on the National Guard in homeland defense is increasing.
State-deployed National Guard units could be charged with enforcing
the quarantine. Although the state-deployed Guard personnel are not
subject to the PCA, the regular Guard units are trained for combat,
not law enforcement. In addition, it is conceivable that, in a germ or
radiation attack that affects more than one state, a governor in State
A could ask for federal military intervention, while the governor in
State B may wish to rely on state-deployed National Guard units, or
no military personnel at all. Or one or both governors could dispute
the President's judgment that federalized National Guard personnel
should enforce quarantine or curfew or border and travel restrictions.
The President could federalize the Guard for the purposes of
enforcing the quarantine, but only upon a state request, given the lack
of federal quarantine authority, unless the President relies on the
Insurrection Act provision that permits unilateral presidential orders
of military deployment in the event of a breakdown of civil
authorities in a state. Otherwise the federalized Guard units would
also then be subject to the PCA, and the operation would require a
different independent legal justification. 1" Although the absence of
142. See, e.g., United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1993).
143. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 100-989, 455, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2503, 2583.
144. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000), permits the President
to "take any ... measure ... which the President deems necessary to protect the
public health or welfare or the environment" whenever the release of a
contaminant "may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health
or welfare." Id. § 9604(a)(1). Although written to support cleanup of environmental
hazards, CERCLA could permit federal authorities to restrict access or conduct
evacuations in a WMD terrorist incident, either in support of state and local
authorities or as an independent federal action. If CERCLA did become the
predicate for federal action, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would be
the lead federal agency. A military role could occur in support of an EPA
determination to rely on CERCLA to quarantine or restrict access to an area
following a WMD terrorist incident. A presidential declaration pursuant to the
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federal legal restrictions would afford more discretion for state
officials to deploy National Guard units, in the event of a significant
deployment cost factors may favor federal activation, since the
federal government would pay for the operation once the force is
federalized.
Even more difficult legal questions could arise where a state
adjacent to one suffering from a WMD terrorist attack decides to
close its borders to those fleeing a contagion. While the states retain
police powers to protect their citizens, a wholesale border closure
might unfairly affect those unaffected by the terrorists who seek
refuge from the contaminated state. It is unclear whether federal
officials, civilian or military, could force the adjacent state to accept
contaminated persons.
A former Army National Guard director has warned that
freighting the military role for homeland defense onto the Guard
could created a "worse-case" scenario, where the Guard "becomes a
quasi-federal, domestic constabulary" with a singular focus that
diminishes its role as the primary reserve for the Army's fighting
force.'45 The Army "then becomes a purely federal force of
unprecedented size, threatening the economic, social and political
traditions of our country." 146  Ironically, assuming that policy
preferences are to utilize Guard forces in state active-duty status, a
state's funding priorities may drive a decision to federalize any large-
scale or expensive military deployment in response to a terrorist
incident to force the transfer of the costs of the deployment to the
federal government.147 Although any federalized National Guard
force would be subject to the PCA, other authorities would permit the
Guard to act--even to engage in direct law enforcement-in response
to a domestic terrorism incident.
Others see the Guard as the component of the armed forces best
situated to be the "lead military agency for homeland security." '48
Because the Guard is located throughout the nation with its members
Insurrection Act could authorize federal support, military and civilian, to state and
local officials in enforcing a quarantine. The problems due to the lack of federal
quarantine authority may thus be averted through the environmental emergency
mechanism. Otherwise, the CERCLA option presents the same potential for
federal-state confusion or even conflict as described above.
145. William A. Navas Jr., Posse Comitatus, the Army of the 21st Century and
the Law of Unintended Consequences, National Guard, January 1, 1999, at 34, n. 1.
146. Id.
147. Bruce M. Lawlor, Military Capabilities and Domestic Terrorism 2
(Perspectives on Preparedness No.2, August 2001).
148. Jack Spencer & Larry M. Wortzel, The Role of the National Guard in
Homeland Security 4 (The Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1532, April 8,
2002).
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from every community, Guard units are arguably well positioned to
assist first responders or to respond otherwise to attacks on the
homeland. In July 2003 command and control of the National Guard
was transformed into a joint bureau with a joint staff, from separate
Army and Air National Guard headquarters to a Standing Joint Force
Headquarters. Headquarters' staff includes federal military
personnel, and the Defense Science Board (DSB) has recommended
that emergency preparedness and coordination officers join the Joint
Forces Headquarters in each state, and that the new state
Headquarters report to the new military command for the homeland,
Northern Command, described below. The DSB maintained in its
November 2003 report that "the best course of action is to use the
Guard to the maximum extent possible in title thirty-two status for all
federal-purpose domestic operations." 14 9 According to DSB, among
the advantages of maximizing Guard use in such circumstances are
utilizing existing state command structures to save time in deploying
units, and the ready use of volunteers to avoid mobilizing units.I"'
The legal parameters of National Guard and reserve roles in a
public health emergency may be summarized in this way:
* The PCA does not deter state deployed National Guard
forces, but cost factors provide an incentive for state
officials to favor federalized forces if a significant
deployment is anticipated;
" No mechanisms exist other than interstate compacts for
mediating conflicts between bordering states concerning
the assignment of Guard or reserves, such as a border
closure designed to deter those fleeing an outbreak in a
neighboring state;
" Federalized Guard and reserves could only engage in law
enforcement pursuant to the Insurrection Act or special
statutory WMD authorities.
E. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Civilian Controls
The explicit assignment to the military of a national security
mission of protecting the homeland complicates further the military
role in providing support to civil authorities. When the new Unified
Combatant Command, the United States Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) was made operational on October 1, 2002, it became
the first ever command authority for homeland Defense.
NORTHCOM will provide support to civilian authorities for
149. DSB Study, supra note 137.
150. Id.
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managing the consequences of natural and terrorism-related disasters,
but it will also "deter, prevent and defeat external threats against the
American homeland."'' 5'
The assignment of homeland defense responsibility assures that
NORTHCOM can be responsible for enforcing quarantine once the
Insurrection Act is invoked. No permanent forces are assigned to
NORTHCOM. However, in the event of a terrorist attack on the
United States, the JTF-CS teams operate under NORTHCOM to
support civil authorities."' Potential implementation problems
remain, however.'53 The JTF-CS has been placed in the critical
position of being asked to translate requests for assistance from
civilian officials, almost always from state or local officials, into
requirements that military personnel can meet. As Former JTF-CS
General Bruce Lawlor explained, it is a considerable challenge for
military officers to identify units that are trained and equipped for
war fighting that can be adapted to meet the requirements needed by
the civilian requesters.'54 Beyond simply translating the civilian
request into a form that communicates effectively to a military
commander, and training the war fighters to perform very different
tasks, the authorization to perform the requested tasks also must pass
from the state or local officials through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the Department of Homeland Security, to
the Secretary of Defense, and then to the JTF-CS. The Secretary will
assess the request for military support against criteria prescribed by
the DoD Military Assistance to Civil Authorities Directive reviewed
above. ' The likely first military responders are the federally trained
and funded Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The teams serve under the
command of state governors unless they are federalized by the
President, when they would be subject to the command of the JTF-
CS.
156
A November 2003 study by the Defense Science Board (DSB)
argued that the DoD remains deficient in its capabilities to mitigate
and re-mediate the effects of a major terrorist attack, to provide surge
medical capabilities, and to provide communications operability
151. See U.S. Northern Command, at http://www.northcom.mil.
152. See Joint Task Force Civil Support Unit Fact Sheet, at
http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/pages/factsheet.html.
153. Efforts to train and plan for JTF-CS operations are described in John
Conger, Unique CBRNE Training Issues Face Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
Journal of Homeland Security (April 3, 2004) available at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumalVArticles/BurmoodLucasconger.html.
154. Lawlor, supra note 147, at 4.
155. See id. at 3-6; DoD Directive 3025.15, supra note 43, § 4.2.
156. See Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 366.
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between first responders and federal, state, and local agencies.' 57 The
DSB recommended a range of new tasks for NORTHCOM, including
priorities in the areas of maritime surveillance, defense against law-
altitude aircraft, protection of critical infrastructure, and taking the
lead in training and exercising for homeland defense. 5 8 DSB was
careful to recommend new tasks for NORTHCOM that do not run
afoul of the PCA. Still, implementation problems are not hard to
imagine. How does the NORTHCOM force that is deployed to
protect the local electric utility and its operations conduct its
operations alongside local law enforcement personnel? How will the
military personnel be instructed to react to suspicious activities, and
on whose orders?
Even assuming that authorities are clarified for making and
enforcing quarantine and related measures with some military
support, nettlesome issues remain concerning the rules for the use of
force. At present, state law enforcement agencies, federal agencies
that may be involved in a terrorism incident, and the branches of the
military all have different and sometimes inconsistent rules for the
use of force (RUF), the term often substituted for "rules of
engagement" in domestic operations. When Insurrection Act
conditions exist and applicable procedures are followed, the DoD
Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) rules of engagement
govern United States military involvement Although the Insurrection
Act invocation permits armed military forces directly to enforce the
law and to exercise authority over civilians, GARDEN PLOT rules
presume that civilian authorities should exercise such authority if
possible, including engaging in searches of persons and property.159
State National Guard and law enforcement agency rules may differ
from these, and each of these may vary from state-to-state.
If federal military presence follows a Stafford Act request,
standing rules of engagement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not
apply, and federal forces would instead follow guidelines prescribed
by the incident specific executive order. There is a presumption that
military units deployed in a terrorist incident pursuant to the Stafford
Act will not carry arms, although weapons may be deployed to the
site in storage. The presumption may be overcome on the say-so of
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney
General. " What rules would apply when civilians attack vaccination
157. DSB Study, supra note 137, at 77.
158. Id. at 83; other recommendations for new NORTHCOM activities are listed
id. at 84.
159. Id. at 369.
160. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3125.01, Military
Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Or High-Yield Explosive Situation,
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teams or convoys distributing food and medicine? As a default, each
soldier would employ an inherent right of self-defense. 161 As is the
case with the Insurrection Act situation, state-deployed Guard and
local law enforcement rules are not necessarily harmonious with the
federal rules.
The creation of NORTHCOM raises more questions than it
answers. Among them are:
* What forces will be deployed under NORTHCOM
command, and according to what legal authorities will
they serve?
* How will NORTHCOM troops serve alongside state and
local civilian law enforcement personnel? With state
deployed National Guard units?
* How will the varying rules for the use of force between
federal, state, and local military and civilian personnel be
clarified and unified?
1H1. CONCLUSIONS: CLARIFYING THE FUTURE ROLES AND
MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY IN HOMELAND DEFENSE
Law enforcement in the United States has always been diffuse,
occurring at the lowest common denominators of government. The
Tenth Amendment is merely a textual reference to a constitutional
tradition that recognizes the importance of state and local police
power, where most law enforcement is carried out. Civilian law
enforcement personnel are accountable to local, mostly elected
leaders, who can oversee overzealous police practices. The military
is likewise subject to civilian control, but its accountability is
centralized through a command authority running to the President.
The centralized national command authority is not as suited as local
officials are to monitor law enforcement practices and potential civil
liberties infractions by military forces in the field.
The DoD has recognized "the historic tradition of limiting direct
military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities."1 62
Nonetheless, through exceptions to the PCA and by engaging in
activities that may not involve "direct active" law enforcement, or do
not "pervade" civilian law enforcement, or are not "regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature," the military may act lawfully
in a variety of capacities in a homeland terrorist crisis. Some of the
anticipated roles replicate traditional law enforcement tasks. Others
are more clearly in provision of emergency support for health and
(Aug. 3, 2001).
161. Operational Law Handbook, supra note 20, at 374.
162. DoD Directive 5525.5, supra note 41, § 4.
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safety, while in the gravest circumstances involving some form of
paramilitary attack in the homeland, military forces could be engaged
in war fighting on United States soil.
The concern about an emerging nontraditional military role in
homeland defense explains the reticence of some military and civilian
leaders to support these new initiatives. Apart from the civil liberties
issues, some argue that adding domestic law enforcement tasks to the
set of military missions will "diminish[] combat prowess. ... [T]here
are . . . few synergies between law enforcement and military
missions."' 63 If military personnel are trained to overcome their "shoot
to kill" orientation, they may sacrifice their sharpness as soldiers.
Commanders of these soldiers understandably balk at the law
enforcement training that may steal the war fighting skills that have
been taught.
After September 11, Bush Administration officials cast the
potential role for the military in homeland defense in a more positive
light. With the creation of NORTHCOM and further training of
National Guard and Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support
Teams (WMD-CSTs), there exists considerable momentum for
expanding the preparedness of military units for homeland roles in
combat and in support of civilian authorities. In this brief final
section, I will highlight a few overarching obstacles to normalizing
a military role in homeland defense that are presented by a potential
biological weapons attack.
A. Civil Liberties, the Use of Force, and the Military Role in a
Biological Weapon Attack
Civilian law enforcement personnel are trained to protect
individual rights and to presume innocence, even when dealing with
the most objectionable suspects. Likewise, police are instructed to
use force only when necessary and then to use as little force as
possible. In contrast, soldiers are trained to kill or destroy. Asking
soldiers to become cops is thus asking for trouble. Training may be
a solution, but the military commanders are reluctant to lose the
soldier's traditional military sharpness. State National Guard
personnel do receive civil disturbance training, however, and
personnel who have not been so trained may perform only support
functions during a civil disturbance. " Civil disturbance training
163. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Thick Green Line: The Growing Involvement
of Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement, in Militarizing the American
Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police
29, 35 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001).
164. United States Department of Army, National Guard Bureau Reg. 500-1,
Military Support to Civil Authorities, 4-11, (Feb. 1996), available at
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includes use of force, riot batons, apprehension and detention of
persons, media relations, firearms training and testing, and standards
of conduct. 65 Use of force by state National Guard personnel is,
however, governed by state law, not by federal guidelines.'66 If state
Guard personnel use federal equipment or property while deployed
in a civil disturbance, federal guidelines similar to the DoD Civil
Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) apply' unless state law is more
restrictive, in which case state law applies. 67 The federal instruction
for state-deployed Guard personnel also advises that civilian law
enforcement should apprehend civilians to the extent possible. If
state Guard personnel must act, personnel are bound by guidelines
issued by the Attorney General in each state, according to state
law. 168
If military are deployed in a civil disturbance operation, the
GARDEN PLOT mission statement gives commanders discretion to
use federal military forces to assist civil law enforcement in
"restoring" law and order. 169 The Army Field Manual indicates that
such missions include crowd dispersion, patrolling areas affected by
the disturbance, maintaining communication and transportation
systems, setting up roadblocks, and cordoning off areas.17 1 Federal
forces so deployed are subject to the operational command of a task
force commander and may not fall under civilian or non-federal
status military command.
If care is not taken to vest what may become essential law
enforcement tasks in military personnel trained to perform law
enforcement, a litany of civil liberties problems could arise.
GARDEN PLOT rules of engagement supply guidance to forces
engaged in civil disturbance operations, and a summary of the
general principles is included in a pocket card that should be issued
to all participating forces.' 7 ' Although the overriding principle of the
GARDEN PLOT rules is to use the minimum forces necessary,
considerable interpretive discretion remains with the commander.
For example, the Army Field Manual states that riot control
equipment should not be used if saturating the area with troops will
http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubfiles/10/108101.pdf [hereinafter NGR 500-1].
165. Id. at 4-4.
166. Id. at 4-6.
167. Id.
168. Id. at I 4-6(d).
169. Id. at Basic Plan 3.
170. U. S. Dep't of the Army, Field Manual No. 19-15, Civil Disturbances 1-3,
(Nov. 25, 1985), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/
army/fm/19-15/index.html [hereinafter FM 19-15].
171. DOPLAW Handbook, supra note 101, at 70.
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quell the disturbance. 7 2 What level of force is permitted to stop
someone who drives through a roadblock? What about a curfew or
quarantine violator?
Military deployed in civil disturbances may detain civilians who
are rioting, looting, or otherwise engaged in criminal behavior.
7 3
The military instructions acknowledge that searches, seizures, and
detentions must comply with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and
that federal troops should not be involved in searches and seizures
unless there is "an immediate danger of violence, destruction of
evidence, or escape of violent persons unless the search is conducted
without delay." 74 Similarly, military deployed in a civil disturbance
may only operate a detention facility on a temporary basis if civilian
facilities cannot accommodate the numbers of detainees and if central
command authority approves.1
Nor may federal forces restrict the movement of civilian
populations, such as by establishing curfews, quarantines, or other
travel restrictions, although the local commander may recommend
the same to local government officials. 7 6 Because no federal agency
including the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) can,
practically speaking, enforce a quarantine or similar restriction on the
civilian population, state or federal military forces may be tasked
with this enforcement role. If the force is federal, only an
Insurrection Act proclamation by the President or an executive order
invoking defensive war powers could legitimate the military role in
law enforcement.
In general, rules for the use of force are not specifically made and
standardized across relevant federal, state, and local agencies. For
example, what defines a successfully enforced quarantine? Is it
permissible to permit "leakage" of ten or fifteen percent of the
affected persons in a quarantine situation? If not, is the use of force
permitted to enforce the restriction? How much force? What
procedures would be required for an individual who wishes to
challenge quarantine or forced vaccination? Finally, none of the
laws, planning documents, or guidelines supply durational limits for
the military operations prescribed. 177
172. FM 19-15, supra note 170, at 7-1.
173. NGR 500-1, supra note 164, at C-1-12.
174. DOPLAW Handbook, supra note 101, at 74.
175. FM 19-15, supra note 170, at 12-13; NGR 500-1, supra note 164, at C-1-
12, E-5.
176. FM 19-15, supra note 170, at 6-11, 6-12.
177. This is not literally true; the Stafford Act emergency authorization for
military deployment is limited to ten days. See supra text accompanying note 56.
However, the Stafford Act permits military support following disaster and
emergency declarations, independent of the emergency authority. Id.
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B. Codification, Clarification, and Simplification
Whatever their efficacy, the existing patchwork authorities for
military support in the event of a terrorist attack in the homeland are
bewilderingly complex. Because written law is largely reactive this
state of affairs is not surprising and it is remediable, in part by
collecting and then simplifying the range of authorities reviewed
above into one title of the United States Code. Redundancies should
be eliminated, consistency among categories of terrorist threats and
incidents may be achieved, and clarification of decision points and
the relationship of federal to state and local authorities should be
spelled out. In addition, a clearer and more definitive statement
should indicate that the general proviso against military involvement
in civilian law enforcement applies to all military actors, whatever
their branch or service, including the Coast Guard.
Apart from problems of codification, the Fifth Annual Report to
the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction 7 s (the Gilmore Commission, for its Chair,
Governor James Gilmore) conjures a "Future Vision 2009," where
statutory authority and regulations for use of the military in the
homeland have significantly improved understanding of military
roles and missions. In 2004, however, problems remain in
establishing clear command and control, in identifying missions, in
training, and even in defining what is meant by homeland defense.
In part, the problems are attributable, according to an earlier report
of the Commission, to "an inadequate understanding of the sequence
of commitment of local, State, and Federal response."17 9 Despite the
fact that military forces are always under ultimate civilian command,
the Commission reinforced its earlier recommendation that some
agency other than the DoD be designated as lead federal agency, in
part due to civil liberties concerns and in part out of concern that
military leaders may not be adequately equipped to make decisions
based on civilian response plans with myriad roles and missions
largely unfamiliar in the military tradition.
178. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Comm'n), Fifth Annual Report
to the President and the Congress, Forging America's New Normalcy: Securing
our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Dec. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanelL.
179. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Comm'n), Third Annual Report
to the President and the Congress, For Ray Downey (Dec. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror3-screen.pdf [hereinafter Gilmore Comm'n
Third Annual Report].
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Despite the fact that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said on
July 2002 that "everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the
business of providing an armed force for the United States,"' s
NORTHCOM may be deployed in just such a way. Along with the
still-undefined nature of its homeland defense role, NORTHCOM
work and facilities suggest that officials there are mimicking the roles
in homeland security given by Congress to the Department of
Homeland Security."'
C. Phasing the Incident Management Tasks
All terrorist incidents are local, or at least will start that way.
Presumptively, local emergency response, public health, and law
enforcement personnel will manage any domestic terrorist incidents.
Local responders will only call in state capabilities, potentially
including the National Guard, on the governor's orders to the extent
that the local medical, fire, police, and emergency personnel and non-
governmental agencies cannot control and manage the consequences
of the incident. In turn, if a state is unable to manage the crisis and
its consequences, the governor may turn to other states if there is an
applicable mutual assistance compact, or the state may seek federal
support through the Department of Homeland Security. Only if other
capabilities fail to stem the crisis may military forces be requested by
a governor or by the President. The force structure could consist of
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CSTs), Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) teams under
NORTHCOM command, or larger commitments, again presumably
under evolving NORTHCOM configurations. Specific arrangements
for military enforcement of operations such as quarantine are not yet
addressed in the Federal Response Plan or supporting documents.
Experience with major federal exercises for terrorism
preparedness have generally demonstrated major operational
weaknesses in inter-agency relations and communications, and in
coordinating between federal, state, and local participants."12 The
complex and constantly changing nature of incident response plans
and rules certainly contributes to the weaknesses noted in federal
exercises. Isolating the military role under the still evolving Federal
Response Plan reveals ongoing problems of phasing and managing
180. Jim McGee & Caitlin Harrington, In the Mountains of Colorado, the
Pentagon Grows a Big New Homeland Intelligence Center, Cong. Q. Homeland
Security, daily ed. (Nov. 20, 2003).
181. Id.
182. See e.g., Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman & Tara O'Toole, A Plague on
Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 32 Clinical Infectious Diseases 436
(2001).
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incident response. If federal assets are engaged in a terrorist incident,
a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) will be deployed to the scene,
along side the Department of Homeland Security Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO). Because there are no procedures or
plans that lay out the DCO tasks, an incident specific executive order
will likely be drafted in the office of the Assistant Secretary for
Homeland Defense (ASD/HD) and signed by the Secretary. Once
deployed the DCO will likely call for JTF-CS resources, through
NORTHCOM. A declaration by the President under the Stafford Act
or Insurrection Act could trigger additional DoD deployment, also
under NORTHCOM, most likely involving JTF-CS.
D. The National Guard
It may well be that today's citizen militia, the National Guard,
offers the best vehicle for responding to any law enforcement
challenges presented by domestic terrorism. Guard personnel may be
drawn when needed by a governor from a local area to perform law
enforcement tasks close to home. The PCA does not constrain this
use of the National Guard, but the modem reality of military training
and the ongoing assignment of Guard units as reserve for the Army's
fighting force complicates their role. 83 Worse yet, if state-deployed
National Guard units become regularly deployed for local law
enforcement related to counter terrorism-as security for mass
transit, for example-the development of a standing domestic
constabulary could raise the very fears that the PCA was designed to
allay. Federalizing the National Guard on an as needed basis is
currently tempting for governors who then do not pay for their
deployment, but is worrisome because of the PCA and other legal
limits, and because the command and accountability is no longer then
local.
The Fifth Annual Report of the Gilmore Commission also
supports using the National Guard as a bridge between civil and
military authorities in terrorism response in the homeland. However,
Guard personnel other than Civil Support Teams (CSTs) are
generally trained for combat, not for responding to terrorist incidents,
or for the varied tasks of law enforcement. As former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb put it, the military "is trained
to vaporize, not Mirandize."' 4 Moreover, current Army terrorism
183. See Doug Sample, Guard, Reserve Cited for Improved Homeland Defense
Capabilities, DefenseLINK News, May 7, 2004, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/nO5032004_200405037.html.
184. Quoted in Douglas Holt, DA Questions Military Account ofBorder Slaying;
Drug Unit Spokesman Calls Remarks Surprising, Dallas Morning News, June 4,
1997, at IA.
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response capabilities are largely located in the Army Reserve rather
than the Guard. The Commission thus recommends that the DoD and
state governors develop specific mission areas for Guard support
during a terrorist incident, and that homeland security units and
missions be organized with state Guard structures, supported by
training and equipment appropriate to the tasks. 85 Although the PCA
does not constrain the law enforcement activities of state-deployed
Guard forces, differing state laws may limit specific roles for Guard
personnel. For example, some states have specific laws forbidding
Guard personnel from performing security in airports.
186
In any event, if a major WMD event occurred, the Guard would
likely be federalized quickly. Just what Guard forces would do is not
clear. The potential for a biological weapons attack to overwhelm
our public health resources suggests that National Guard elements
could provide critical support to provide a back-up medical surge
capacity in the cities or other locations where help is needed. An
outbreak of the dimensions hypothesized here could be managed, if
at all, only with thousands of surge capacity personnel, trained in
distribution and dissemination of vaccines and other medical
equipment and services, in transportation and communications
related to the medical emergency, in enforcing quarantine or other
necessary restrictions on the civilian population, and in providing
essential triage when the demand for local services outstrips capacity.
In the end, it is safe to say that the military role in a homeland
defense emergency is evolving. What the normalized state of affairs
will be is difficult to predict. However, in a public health crisis of the
magnitude outlined in this article, it may be essential for soldiers to
be trained to provide a public health surge capacity. Some of the
tasks that would need to be performed would not call into question
even traditional notions of posse comitatus, while others would
classically be characterized as enforcing the laws. It appears likely
that the new normal will include an emerging public health back-up
role for the military. Some overarching issues remain, including
these:
" Should the military be authorized to enforce restrictions
on movement, travel, and mandatory vaccinations? If so,
pursuant to which rules for the use of force?
" Can and should military personnel be trained to provide
or supplement a medical surge capacity, e.g., to
administer vaccinations, supply equipment,
transportation, and communications, to guard medicine or
185. Gilmore Comm'n Third Annual Report, supra note 179, at 52.
186. Id. at 53.
2004] 777
778 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
vaccination centers? If so, will new legal authorities be
required?
Should soldiers be permitted to operate civilian
infrastructure facilities, such as public facilities, in the
event of a public health emergency?
* What durational limits should be imposed on any
authorization for the use of military in a biological
weapons attack?
